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BRITISH IDEALIST AESTHETICS
Collingwood, Wollheim, and the Origins of Analytic Aesthetics

two, Bernard Bosanquet and Robin Collingwood appear, therefore, to
be the only idealist aestheticians of significance in the first half of the
twentieth century.4 Of the two, Collingwood knew more about art5 and
was by far more original, as he produced a philosophy of art that truly
engaged with the artistic preoccupations of his days in The Principles
of Art (Collingwood 1938). Among the ‘realists’, the topic was hardly
more popular: only Samuel Alexander and E. F. Carritt showed any interest. While Alexander defended a ‘realist’ account in Beauty and other
Forms of Value (Alexander 1933) and in some shorter pieces collected in
Philosophical and Literary Pieces (Alexander 1939), according to which
“artistic experience is not so much invention as discovery” (Alexander
1939, 228), Carritt, who taught at Oxford until the late 1940s, gave
up his ‘realism’ under the influence of the aesthetics of the Italian neoHegelian, Benedetto Croce, but never reached an original position of
his own.6 As an illustration, one may quote from one of his last papers,
on Croce:

1. INTRODUCTION: BRITISH AESTHETICS IN THE 20TH CENTURY

Although Great Britain is the country of some of the earliest contributors to aesthetics as an independent philosophical discipline, from
Lord Shaftesbury to Edmund Burke, and the country of John Ruskin,
who was probably the greatest and most influential art critic of the
19th century,1 the subject attracted little interest in philosophical circles
towards the turn of the twentieth century. Of course, one must distinguish here aesthetics as a philosophical discipline from art criticism,
where the English made many important contributions at the beginning
of the 20th century; one need only recall here the names of members of
the Bloomsbury group such as Roger Fry or Clive Bell.2 As John Passmore once pointed out, the journal Mind published only a handful of
papers in aesthetics over the twenty-eight years (1892-1920) of G. F.
Stout’s editorship (Passmore 1976, 35). British philosophy was then
divided between ‘idealists’ and ‘realists’. Within the ‘idealist’ school,
which was then dominant, only four men were ever interested in aesthetics.3 Of these, John Alexander Smith, who was Waynflete Professor
of Metaphysics at Oxford (thus a predecessor of Collingwood, Ryle, and
Strawson), did not publish his essays – they remain unpublished to this
day – and another, his student Arthur Ritchie Lord moved to South
Africa, and seems to have played only a very minor role. The other

I am sure that in my unregenerate days when I called a
flower or a picture beautiful, I meant that it had that quality
as truly as it had its shape. But I have come to think, with
Croce’s help, that I was wrong, and that all I am entitled to
say is that it stimulates in me and perhaps others the kind
of experience I call aesthetic: to call a thing beautiful is for
me a statement about my experience; to make or imagine a
beautiful thing, or the appreciation of one, is to express my
experience. (Carritt 1953, 455)
In this paper, I shall focus on Bosanquet and Collingwood. Today, they are rarely read, especially outside the English-speaking world,
where Collingwood still makes an appearance in undergraduate courses
and in anthologies. For example, if one opens the Encyclopaedia of Aesthetics published in 1998, one will find an entry on Collingwood (Anderson 1998), but there is no trace of Bosanquet. The very few who know
their names usually dismiss them as ‘idealists’ or ‘neo-Hegelians’. As we
shall see, Collingwood is often dismissed as having held an indefensible,
outmoded ‘ideal’ theory, according to which the work of art is primarily
‘mental’, while his potential role in current debates is simply ignored.
To give one striking example of the latter, the late art historian Michael
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Baxandall is often praised for his view of the work of art as, to put
it briefly, a solution to a problem arising from the particular situation
caused by the implementation of a set conventions in a given context;
Yves Michaud even describes his work as the “most concrete illustrations” of Wittgenstein’s position (Michaud 1999, 85). The truth is that
Baxandall took his lead from Collingwood, not Wittgenstein.7 Michaud
also attributes to Richard Wollheim the idea that art should be defined
not merely from the artist’s point of view, or the audience’s point of
view for that matter, but through the recognition that the artist and the
audience can exchange their positions (Michaud 1999, 12). Again, the
position is actually Collingwood’s.8 There is some irony in the fact that
it is attributed to the man who did most to insure that Collingwood’s
books would never be read again, as we shall presently see.
After the Second World War, British aesthetics was hardly in a better
shape than during Stout’s days as editor of Mind. As Gary Kemp noticed
(Kemp 2003, 171), aesthetics suffered greatly from widespread scepticism concerning substantive theorizing (e.g., in (Weitz 1956), (Kennick
1958) or (Passmore 1959)), the ‘ideal’ theory being a case at hand.9 Aesthetics was also often seen merely as a source of ‘confusions’ in need
of ‘clarification’;10 the ‘confusions’ under study being inevitably those
of the ‘idealists’, especially those of Croce, apparently relayed in the
English-speaking world by Collingwood or Carritt. As for the few philosophers of that era less averse to theorizing, such as Russell, they had
simply nothing to say on aesthetics.11
Analytic aesthetics is now thriving, and this renaissance is in large
part due to the publication in 1968 of Richard Wollheim’s Art and its
Objects12 and Nelson Goodman’s The Languages of Art (Goodman 1968).
While Wollheim’s preoccupations are markedly different from those of
his distant ‘idealist’ predecessors, whose books remained mostly closed
since the 1940s, he sought nevertheless to criticize them.13 The target
of Wollheim’s critique is a ‘theory’, for which he uses the label ‘CroceCollingwood’,14 and which he described in these words:
First, that the work of art consists in an inner state or condition of the artist, called an intuition or an expression: secondly, that this state is not immediate or given, but is the
product of a process, which is peculiar to the artist, and
which involves articulation, organization, and unification:
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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thirdly, that the intuition so developed may be externalized
in a public form, in which case we have the artefact which
is often but wrongly taken to be the work of art, but equally
it need not be. (Wollheim 1980, 36-37)
One key feature is the ‘subjective’ or ‘ideal’ character of the work of
art:
[N]ot only can the artist create a particular work of art
without in point of fact ever externalizing it, but his capacity in general to create works of art, or his attainment
as an artist (as we might put it) may flourish quite independently of there being in existence any means of externalization. The artist is an artist solely in virtue of his inner
life [. . . ] we must appreciate that it is an essential feature
of the Croce-Collingwood thesis that not only can the artist
make works of art to himself, but that he may be in the situation in which he can only make works of art to himself.
(Wollheim 1980, 114-115)
Paraphrasing him, the ‘ideal’ theory is said to have three features:
(a)

The work of art consists in an inner state or condition of the
artist, called an intuition or an expression.

(b)

This state is not immediate or given, but is the product of a
process peculiar to the artist.

(c)

The intuition so developed may be externalized in a public form,
but equally it need not be.

Wollheim then proceeded to argue against this theory with the following two points (Wollheim 1980, 40). First, by making the work of art
something ‘ideal’, i.e., inner or mental, there is no object to which both
artist and the audience can have access:
(d)

The link between the artist and the audience is severed,

Secondly, that a sculptor, for example, must carve a piece of marble to
produce a statue to be seen by the audience is by no means a minor,
almost irrelevant aspect of the production of the work of art. In other
words,
Vol. 4: 200 Years of Analytical Philosophy
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(e)

The ‘ideal’ theory totally ignores the significance of the medium.

Wollheim has also a further argument related to (d), to which I shall
return in due time.15 For the moment, it suffices to note that agreement
with Wollheim on these two points is now almost universal. As a matter of fact, as an objection, (e) is not even original: it was already
levelled against Croce, as far as I can tell for the first time, by Samuel
Alexander in the 1930s (Alexander 1933, 57-59; 1939, 230), and it was
debated in the 1950s (Hospers 1956, 293) (Gallie 1959, 18). Furthermore, the case for the intrinsic limitations of the medium was already
made forcefully, in the case of painting, by E. H. Gombrich in chapter I of Art and Illusion (Gombrich 1961, 32-62).16 The problem I have
with Wollheim’s critique is rather that he utterly misrepresented Collingwood’s views when labelling his target the ‘Croce-Collingwood theory’.17 That Collingwood did not hold the ‘ideal’ theory has been shown
already by Aaron Ridley (Ridley 1997, 1998),18 and I do not wish to
reduplicate his arguments,19 especially those against the use of argument (e) against Collingwood, for whom engagement with the medium
is indeed an essential part of art. Indeed, Collingwood has some wonderful pages on Cézanne, Bernard Berenson and Vernon Blake in which
he clearly affirms the importance of engaging with the medium in a
physical manner (Collingwood 1938, 144-148), pages that would contradict the claim that (e) applies to his position. Since Wollheim does
not provide a textual basis, if anything the presumption (re-enforced by
Ridley’s analyses) is that it is he who is guilty of misreading Collingwood.
Furthermore, Wollheim’s account leaves no room for Collingwood’s
claim, which will become crucial later on, that in the ‘expression of an
emotion’, there is no such thing as an emotion existing prior to and
independently of its expression:
Until a man expresses his emotion he does not yet know
what emotion it is. The act of expressing it is therefore an
exploration of his own emotions. He is trying to find out
what these emotions are. There is certainly here a directed
process: an effort, that is, directed upon a certain end;
but the end is not something foreseen and preconceived,
to which appropriate means can be thought out in the light

www.thebalticyearbook.org
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of our knowledge of its special character. Expression is an
activity of which there can be no technique. (Collingwood
1938, 111)
[. . . ] the expression of an emotion is not, as it were, a
dress made to fit an emotion already existing, but is an activity without which the experience of that emotion cannot
exist. Take away the language and you take away what is
expressed. (Collingwood 1938, 244)20
One may again insist that Collingwood just contradicts himself, since
he held (a) and (c). After all didn’t he write:
[. . . ] a piece of music is [. . . ] something which may exist
solely in the musician’s head. (Collingwood 1938, 151)
Setting aside ‘ontological’ issues about the work of art,21 this is simply to overlook the plain fact that, when Collingwood was speaking
of ‘expression of emotion’, he meant linguistic expression. Anyone can
compose a tune expressing an emotion by whistling it in one’s head
and keep it for oneself, but how could a tune be thus whistled ‘in one’s
head’ without any appeal to any musical language? And, since what is
expressed in language is already in principle shareable, one may keep
one’s thoughts for oneself, but they are in principle accessible and shareable (at least if you are agreeing with Wittgenstein, to whom Collingwood is indeed very close):
A man may, no doubt, speak to himself and be his own
hearer; but what he says to himself is in principle capable of
being said to any one sharing his language. (Collingwood
1938, 317)
As a matter of fact, it is very clear that the principle of Wollheim’s
characterization and critique of the ‘Croce-Collingwood’ theory is to
deny this very possibility, but not only is it ridiculous to assume that this
was not what Collingwood had in mind given what he actually wrote
(passages such as this one are conveniently overlooked by Wollheim), it
is also on this very point that Bosanquet criticized and rejected Croce, a
rejection in which, I shall claim, Collingwood followed Bosanquet, going a few steps further towards a more satisfactory theory. I shall argue
Vol. 4: 200 Years of Analytical Philosophy
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now in a more historical fashion, providing links with Bosanquet, who
rejected Croce’s aesthetics on grounds that he works with a woefully
inadequate view of language and also by emphasizing at the end of the
paper that Collingwood’s move towards a ‘community view’ of the work
of art was essential to his rejection of the ‘ideal’ theory.
Before moving on, however, I should add two small but important
exegetical points to my rejoinder to Wollheim’s reading of Collingwood
(as I do not intend to linger on this issue). First, as Richard Sclafani
pointed out already some time ago (Sclafani 1976, 353-357), Wollheim misreads Collingwood because he does not distinguish between
two uses of ‘imaginary’ and ‘imaginative’ in Collingwood’s text. Indeed,
these words might be understood as meaning something like ‘in the
form of a mental image’, as in Collingwood’s discussion of the engineer’s ‘imaginary bridge’ (Collingwood 1938, 131) or as meaning, as
the Oxford English Dictionary has it (as one of meanings of ‘imagination’): “The mind; thinking; thought, opinion”. This more general
meaning might be obsolete – one finds it, e.g., in Hobbes or Hume –
but it clearly fits Collingwood’s uses in the section on ‘imaginative expression’ (Collingwood 1938, 235f.) as well as in passages such as this,
where ‘language’ and ‘art proper’ are equated with ‘imaginative activity’:
The aesthetic experience, or artistic activity, is the experience of expressing one’s emotions; and that which expresses them is the total imaginative activity called indifferently language or art. This is art proper. (Collingwood
1938, 275)
Wollheim’s reading can only make sense when one recognizes only
the first meaning and then misreads all passages concerning the ‘total imaginative activity’ or ‘imaginative experience of total activity’ of
the artist or of the audience.22 To claim that Collingwood collapsed
both meanings implies that he must have held some sort of ‘picture
theory’, but he emphatically rejected such theories (Collingwood 1938,
172-194). In fairness to Wollheim, however, it must be said that Collingwood is himself confused at times, including in passages on which
Wollheim’s reading is based.23 However, it should become clear from
the following section that Wollheim’s reading is appropriate for Croce’s

www.thebalticyearbook.org

8

British Idealist Aesthetics

aesthetics, my point being that Bosanquet and Collingwood rejected this
sort of view for that very reason.
This point is of importance, since some of the most valuable arguments in Collingwood’s Principles of Art concern his critique of the
idea that the experience of a work of art is purely sensual and that
it is purely passive. His analogy in this context between understanding a work of art and the hearing of a science lecture (Collingwood
1938, 140-141), which cannot be fully understood if the audience is
said merely to hear sounds, has been misread, because Collingwood
suggests that “we must reconstruct” – he might as well have said ‘reenact’ – the lecturer’s ideas “in our minds” (Collingwood 1938, 141),
and this looks as if he is ‘doubling-up’24 the ‘total imaginative activity’
of the artist in the audience’s mind. There are many reasons why one
would want to see this as plainly wrong. For example, Collingwood
argued in The Idea of History and An Autobiography that ‘re-enactment’
of someone else’s thought results not in thinking a copy of her thought
which would be at best numerically different from the original thought,
but exactly the same thought (one of his arguments for this is simply
that numerical identity does not apply to thoughts).25 So Collingwood
was never in the business of ‘doubling up’ thoughts. Below I shall give
further reasons to see this as a misreading.
Secondly, I think that one should take seriously the fact that Wollheim’s reading is almost entirely based on excerpts from Book I of Collingwood’s The Principles of Art, as if what he wrote elsewhere in the
book was irrelevant to the proper interpretation of his thought.26 This is
particularly problematic since Collingwood tended to fit his arguments
within a thesis-antithesis-synthesis mould typical of British Idealists. He
was quite clear about this in An Essay on Philosophical Method:
The philosophers who have had the deepest instinct for
style have repeatedly shrunk from adopting the form of a
lecture or instructive address, and chosen instead that of a
dialogue in which the work of self-criticism is parcelled out
among the dramatis personae, or a meditation in which the
mind communes with itself, or a dialectical process where
the initial position is modified again and again as difficulties
come to light. (Collingwood 2005, 210)

Vol. 4: 200 Years of Analytical Philosophy
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There is of course no reason to believe that these words, especially
the last clause, do not apply to his own writings. In fact, Collingwood’s
true views in The Principles of Art are only expressed adequately in
Book III, once remarks from Book I are corrected through considerations found in Book II.27 Collingwood is quite explicit about this in a
number of places in the book, including at the end of Book I, where he
points out that the theory in Book III results from the “union” of the
lines of enquiry of the previous Books (Collingwood 1938, 153), and
in a telling footnote to the section from which the above quotation was
taken:
The reader understands, I hope, that everything I say in
Book I is avowedly provisional, and that my theory of art is
not stated until Book III. (Collingwood 1938, 136, n.1)
Accordingly, Book III opens with this remark:
The empirical and descriptive work of Book I left us with
the conclusion that art proper, as distinct from amusement
or magic, was (i) expressive, (ii) imaginative. Both of these
terms, however, awaited definition: we might know how
to apply them [. . . ] but we did not know to what theory
concerning the thing so designated this application might
commit us. It was to fill this gap in our knowledge that
we went on to the analytical work of Book II. (Collingwood
1938, 273)
Note that Collingwood explicitly states that up to that point he has
not defined what he means by art proper being ‘expressive’ and ‘imaginative’! He had already warned the reader at the very end of Book I,
when introducing Book II, which is entitled ‘The Theory of Imagination’:
In Book II therefore, I shall make a fresh start. I shall try
to work out a theory of imagination and of its place in
the structure of experience as a whole, by developing what
has already been said about it by well-known philosophers
[Croce? C.K.]. In doing this I shall make no use whatever
of anything contained in Book I. (Collingwood 1938, 152153)
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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Collingwood is therefore perfectly coherent and transparent in his
strategy. But all of this undermines Wollheim’s reading because he
draws only on quotations from Book I.28
2. CROCE AND BRITISH IDEALIST AESTHETICS

There is plenty of evidence that many British philosophers of the first
half of the 20th century, such as E. F. Carritt, read Croce and were deeply
influenced by his views. But the older Bosanquet discovered Croce late
in his career and the Italian could not have had any formative influence
on his thinking. Furthermore, Bosanquet strongly rejected just about every premise of Croce’s aesthetics, as we shall see (Bosanquet 1920a,b).
As for Collingwood, the very idea of a ‘Croce-Collingwood’ theory has
its origin in the view, expressed as early as 1953 by Carritt that Collingwood’s Principles of Art is “mainly an implementation of Croce” (Carritt
1953, 453). Collingwood himself wrote to Croce about his book that
“the doctrine taught in it is in all essentials your own” (Collingwood
1964, xiv). There is ample evidence that Collingwood knew very well
and appreciated Croce’s philosophy, which he discovered rather early in
his career because of his interest in Vico: he translated a lot of Croce,
including his book on Vico (Croce 1913) and the second English edition
of his Aesthetics (Croce 1922), which should be attributed to him, not
Douglas Ainslie, whose name appears on the cover.29 As Alan Donagan
points out, evidence of this sort shows that it is not only a question
of priority but one of influence (Donagan 1972, 266). It is clear that
Collingwood owes some of his key ideas to Croce, but it is also clear
that he reformulated them. The question arises therefore of the extent of this reformulation: can we still speak of a ‘Croce-Collingwood’
theory, as some still do today,30 or does Collingwood’s reformulation
modify essential points in a way that undermines the idea that there is
a ‘Croce-Collingwood theory’. The latter is what I aim to show, arguing
that the often criticised ‘ideal theory’ is in Croce but not in Collingwood.
One should recall that, for all his professed admiration, Collingwood
did not share the presuppositions of Croce’s philosophy of history (nor
those of Croce’s follower Gentile) and published an extensive critique
of it (Collingwood 1965, 3-22). In what follows, I shall argue that he
rejected some key presuppositions of Croce’s aesthetics too. Further-
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more, my point will be that his critique of Croce was already in essence
that of Bosanquet. Both argued on the basis of what they perceived as
a wrong conception of linguistic meaning, but, I shall claim, Collingwood did it on the basis of an explanation of meaning which is not only
different, but much more interesting than Bosanquet’s. This led him to
argue for a ‘community view’ of the meaning of the work of art that has,
incidentally, no antecedent whatsoever in Croce.
I shall claim further that Bosanquet and Collingwood both tried to
establish a less ‘subjective’ and thus more ‘objective’ view than Croce.
They both wanted to emphasize the social role of art. On this point,
they sometimes wrote strikingly similar remarks. However, their claims
are, as we shall see, only superficially similar, because they are based
on different premises: on the one hand, Bosanquet either mentions this
social role of art without trying to explain it, or, at best, his explanations
are based on his metaphysics of the Absolute, which is derivative from
Bradley’s. On the other hand, Collingwood in his later period moved
away from his earlier idealist view and began to develop an original
linguistic philosophy which is very similar to that propounded by the
later Wittgenstein, as a basis for his explanation of the social role of
art. In a nutshell, if art is to play a social role, its meaning must be in
principle accessible to all in a way that leaves no room for scepticism,
and Collingwood argued that aesthetic meaning is, like meaning in language, already social or communal. These views of Collingwood’s are
strikingly original and I believe that they are still valuable today.
Since much discussion of these issues consists of attributions of
claims to various authors without any textual basis, and since I cannot presume extensive knowledge of the authors concerned, in what
follows, I shall cite at length Croce, Bosanquet and Collingwood, whenever I attribute a claim to them.
In 1920, Bosanquet published a thirty-page analysis of ‘Croce’s Aesthetics’ in the Proceedings of the British Academy (Bosanquet 1920a). As
a Hegelian philosopher, Bosanquet appreciated some aspects of Croce’s
aesthetics, namely its ability to explain “the rank of beauty among the
experiences of the spirit” and to do justice to the “spirituality” and
“simplicity”, in other words, the autonomy of the beautiful (Bosanquet
1920a, 1). But he could not accept just about anything else in Croce’s
aesthetics; his rejection is not wholesale because he does accept that
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art and beauty could be among ‘forms’ or ‘activities’ of ‘spirit’.31 His
main arguments are against two claims by Croce: first, that ‘intuition’ –
this being Croce’s peculiar concept of intuizione – is prior to conceptual
thought, and, secondly, that it corresponds to a distinct phase or level of
language. Croce’s Aesthetics opens indeed with a sharp distinction between ‘intuition’ and ‘concept’. Since ‘intuition’ is almost synonymous
here with perception (Croce 1992, 3), one should note that he argues
there are pure ‘intuitions’ free from any concepts: this shows that the
presence of conceptual content is not a necessary condition, from which
he infers strangely that, when present in ‘intuition’, concepts
[. . . ] are no longer concepts, having lost any independence
and autonomy. They were, indeed, once concepts but have
now simply become components of intuitions. (Croce 1992,
2)
An ‘intuition’ will be, for example, an “impression of moonlight, depicted by the painter” (Croce 1992, 2) or a “tinge of colour in the sky”
(Croce 1992, 5). What Croce meant by the fact that ‘intuitions’ are at
the same time pre-conceptual while possibly including conceptual content is not clarified, and this is the point against which Bosanquet will
inveigh. Furthermore, ‘intuition’ precedes the distinction between what
is and what is not real (Croce 1992, 3) and in ‘intuition’ not only is
there no subject-object distinction, the subject is literally generating or
constructing objects of the external world out of impressions or sensations:
Intuition embraces, without distinction, both the perception
of what is real, and the representation of what is simply
possible. In intuition we do not situate ourselves, as empirically existing beings, before an already existing external
world, rather we make mental objects out of our impressions, whatever these may be. (Croce 1992, 4)32
According to Croce, therefore, in perception the ‘spirit’ produces, through
a process that is left unanalyzed (except for a short critical discussion
of associationist psychology (Croce 1992, 7-8)), ‘representations’ or pictures of the objects of the external world out of the stimuli it receives.
And this happens at a stage which is distinct from and prior to any truly
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‘conceptual’ activity of the ‘spirit’, which is called ‘Logic’, as opposed to
‘Aesthetics’ – these being the two theoretical activities of the ‘spirit’, to
which Croce adds later two further practical activities. Although Croce
is not specific about this in his opening paragraphs, the ‘conceptual’
activity of the ‘spirit’ consist in the ability to make judgments; the distinction between what is real and what is not real will be drawn only at
this ‘conceptual’ stage.
There are some obvious difficulties with this view that are picked up
by Bosanquet. It is clear that he could not follow Croce. Like Bradley,
he was an ‘objective’ and not a ‘subjective’ idealist, and Croce’s position
certainly appears as a variant of the latter: if there is a distinct stage for
‘intuition’, in that stage there is no distinction between what is real and
what is not real, only pictures produced by the spirit. So it all begins
with a purely subjective state (while for Bradley and his epigones, there
is no such thing) and one is justified to ask if it makes sense to speak
of a picture at a stage where one is not yet in a position to distinguish
between a picture and what it depicts. In typical fashion, Bosanquet
argues that the whole approach is “a nest of contradictions” (Bosanquet
1920a, 8):
The position of art and beauty among the forms of the spirit
is, I believe, a flat self-contradiction. They are essentially
prior to conceptual thought; that is the main point of the
whole arrangement. But this is really impossible. There is
no such prior stage. The image may be free from any explicit judgment; but to call it an image means that it is discriminated by thought and referred to objective conditions.
How else could it be an image of anything? The intuition
is thus at once pre-thought and an object of thought [. . . ]
Croce’s examples leave no doubt, “The intuitions are this
river, this lake, etc.” How can this river be other than an
object of thought having identity, diversity, and all the rest?
(Bosanquet 1920b, 214)
But Croce compounds his problems by adding here the most distinctive
element of his aesthetic theory, namely that this ‘intuition’ is ‘expression’:
Everything that is truly intuition or representation is also
www.thebalticyearbook.org

14

British Idealist Aesthetics

expression. That which is not brought before the mind as
an object by expression is not intuition or representation,
but sensation or something merely natural. The spirit only
intuits by making, forming, expressing. Anyone who separates intuition from expression will never be able to put
them together again. Intuitive activity intuits only insofar
as it expresses [. . . ] To intuit is to express and nothing else
(nothing more but nothing less) than to express. (Croce
1992, 8-9)
To this, one must now add that Croce conceives this expression as intrinsically aesthetic: “poetic material runs in all our souls: only expression,
that is, form, makes a poet”.33 However, since Croce recognizes that
“there can be no thought without words” (Croce 1992, 25), he has to
recover the independent, prior stage of ‘intuition’ within language itself:
Poetry is the language of feeling: prose of the intellect; but
since the intellect, in its concrete reality, is also feeling, every piece of prose has its poetic side. (Croce 1992, 28)
Therefore, there is a poetic dimension to all linguistic expression, and
aesthetics becomes the science of language or linguistics.34 One is reminded here of another Neapolitan philosopher, Vico: this last quotation is almost a paraphrase of Scienza Nuova, Book I, LIII, § 219 (Vico
1984, 75-76). This point is crucial for our understanding of the ‘ideal’
theory or the very possibility of a ‘Croce-Collingwood’ theory. Indeed, it
is clear from the above quotations that Croce has distinguished an independent stage or phase, prior to any conceptual activity, where ‘spirit’
expressed itself through the production of pictures. Even if that expression is linguistic and therefore ‘conceptual’, it retains an aesthetic layer.
One ought now to recall Wollheim’s description of the ‘ideal’ theory in
terms of (a)-(c). Let us drop for the moment (b) and note that, clearly,
Croce is committed to (a). He is also committed to (c):
In fact, of the many expressions and intuitions to which the
spirit gives form, not all are fixed in an external form by us:
not all our thoughts and mental images are spoken aloud,
or written, or printed, or drawn, or coloured, or exhibited
to an audience. Between the crowd of intuitions, formed
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or at least sketched out in our spirits, we choose. [. . . ]
having formed an intuition, there is always the question to
be pondered, whether it is worth communicating to others,
and to whom, and when, and how [. . . ] (Croce 1992, 130)
Croce actually has a lot to say about what he considers the crossing of the “pons asinorum of expression” (Croce 1992, 11), but there is
no need to get into this here, one merely needs to register commitment to (c). To come back to our original question, if (a) and (c)
describe Croce’s aesthetics, do they describe Collingwood’s? As mentioned above, my answer is no. We can see why by enquiring further
into Bosanquet’s critical reaction to Croce.
Indeed, Bosanquet rejects Croce’s identification of ‘intuition’ and ‘expression’. This means rejecting the very possibility of a distinct and fundamental ‘poetic’ phase in language. We saw that Bosanquet already
denied the possibility of a distinct phase for ‘intuition’, arguing that the
very idea is self-contradictory. Now Bosanquet argues that there could
not be any language without a ‘conceptual’ aspect:
The primary function of language, to communicate to a
mind what it does not know in terms of what it already
knows, could not possibly be achieved. The primitive mind,
so far from being purely contemplative and imaginative, is
immersed in practice; and at every moment it must demand
communication through definite and separable elements of
speech. ‘Cross two rivers and turn upstream by the third.’
How could primitive life be carried on without such communications as this? And how could such a sentence convey useful advice if the points at which error is possible
were not distinct and recognizable references? (. . . ) It is an
extraordinary contradiction to appeal, as Croce does more
than once, to the contrast, already remarked by Aristotle,
between the logical assertion or proposition and the sentence used to utter a wish or command. Croce takes this
to mean that the former alone had a significance based in
agreement, while the latter could be seen as a type of the
primitive poetry which he thinks of as free from such meaning and prior to it. But both kinds of sentence alike, though
one of them is not assertory, have of course ‘conventional’
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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or logical significance, and it was to clench this point that I
used an imperative as my illustration. Language, in short, is
not language without its conceptual side; and to equate language with intuition, and treat intuition as prior to thinking, is to shatter and overthrow the whole conception of a
unity of the human mind. (Bosanquet 1920a, 8-9)
One should note that Bosanquet relies in this passage on a crude view of
language as means of communication, i.e., as a vehicle for thoughts. He
does not discuss this view further but simply assumes it is less absurd;
I shall come back to this point. Bosanquet further believes that, with
language shorn of the means to communicate, it is simply not possible
to talk about ‘beauty’:
If expression, beauty, and language are taken in principle as
prior to thought and explicit meaning, then the problem of
beauty is treated as if it were solved, when in truth it has
not yet been raised. (Bosanquet 1920a, 6)
More interestingly in the context of this paper, he ponders about whether,
on Croce’s theory, the meaning of the work of art is reduced to what
amounts to a ‘private’ picture. In other words, Bosanquet is pointing
out that Croce ignores the role of the artefact or medium in art:
Croce rejects, we said, the reality of the external world.
With this rejection, the singleness of the intuition-expression
is forcibly intensified. In art, it is usually felt and held, there
is in some sense an inner and outer. True, beauty lies in
imagination and not in physical character, but yet the striving for expression seems to be a striving to give outward
reality to something from within. To any such feeling of an
inner and an outer in art or beauty Croce will not yield a
hair’s breadth. The external world is not real at all; art is
the most real of things. How then can art become a part of
the external world, or be in any way connected with physical process or media? (Bosanquet 1920a, 10)35
Here, Bosanquet is in effect rejecting (c) using an argument that prefigures Wollheim’s use of (e). For this reason, it seems to me inappropriate to attribute the ‘ideal’ theory to Bosanquet. This is not to
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say that I would deem his views acceptable, simply that it would be
hasty to stick this label on his views without actually looking at what
he wrote. The problem with Bosanquet’s critique, however, was pointed
out by Alexander: it is “to say what is true without assigning a reason”
(Alexander 1939, 220).36 Indeed, Bosanquet does not explain why “the
embodiment is necessary to feeling”.
As I pointed out, Bosanquet assumed in his critique a model of language, according to which, to put it crudely, the speaker forms an intention and then expresses it in language using conventional meaning, and
the hearer deciphers the conventional meaning of the words used in
order to form a picture of the speaker’s intention. According to Bosanquet, Croce’s notion of ‘intuition’ does not fit this model. Wollheim has
a related point, where he bungles his interpretation of Croce (forgetting
for a moment the ‘Collingwood’ of the ‘Croce-Collingwood’ theory), by
claiming that Croce distinguishes art from language: in the case of art,
we are told, the artist
[. . . ] may be in a situation in which he can make works
of art only to himself: in other words, it is possible that he
could have the intuitions and there be no way in the society
of externalizing them. (Wollheim 1980, 115)
Wollheim then contrasts this with the case of language: when one forms
thoughts in the medium of language it is true that one might refrain
from sharing them or “employing them externally”, but it is always in
principle possible to do so. So the theory is not about “the thinker who
has a medium of thought which he uses only to himself”, but about “the
thinker who has no medium of thought” (Wollheim 1980, 116). This is
clearly not fair to Croce, who identifies art and language. As we saw in
our last quotation, any intuition formed is in principle employable externally, to use Wollheim’s jargon. As a matter of fact, this even forces
Croce to claim that the difference between Raphael and any incompetent painter is not in the ability to render on canvas one’s ‘intuition’ but
the quality of the ‘intuition’ itself (Croce 1992, 9-10)! As this last point
shows, Croce’s theory is not without grave difficulties, as it is clear that
he runs afoul of (e).
Now, if we apply the view of language crudely presented above to
the case of art, Bosanquet’s claim amounts to this (of course not in his
own words): Croce thinks that we have something like the intentionwww.thebalticyearbook.org
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in-the-head-of-the-artist, its (contingent) externalization in a physical
object, and the replica-of-the-artist’s-intention-in-the-head-of-the-audience, formed by contact with the physical object. This is exactly what
was meant by ‘doubling up’ at the end of last section. But, according to the above view, this could not be if there is no prior set of conventions for communication in language, for the externalization of the
intention-in-the-head-of-the-artist in a physical object, conventions that
are shared by the audience, whose members are then in a position to
form in their heads replicas-of-the-artist’s-intention. So Croce cannot
explain how we could communicate through the work of art. This last
point is important for Bosanquet since he claims in his Three Lectures on
Aesthetics that
[. . . ] the aesthetic attitude is that in which we have a feeling which is so embodied in an object that it will stand still
to be looked at, and, in principle, to be looked at by everybody. (Bosanquet 1915, 6)
Furthermore, Bosanquet believed that it is essential to the aesthetic feeling that it is a ‘common feeling’. Thus, he says that “you can appeal
to others to share it; and its value is not diminished by being shared”
(Bosanquet 1915, 5). The reasons for Bosanquet’s appeal to a ‘common
feeling’ are rather complex; they have to do with Bosanquet’s belief that
art leads to an expansion of the self, both that of the artist and that of
the spectator.37 If art were to play such a role in the development of
character or consciousness, it would then need to appeal to ‘common
feelings’. We reached here the social motivations behind Bosanquet’s
aesthetics, but we need not enter into them, only notice that, as we
shall see, Collingwood’s theory was also motivated by the social role he
imputed to art.
One should notice, however, that Bosanquet does not clarify what
he means by the ‘embodiment’ of ‘feelings’ in the work of art, nor does
he apparently feel any need to justify the model of language he assumed here. This model involves ‘doubling up’ meanings and it is
not without its own set of difficulties. For example, this ‘doubling
up’ naturally generates scepticism, since there is no guarantee that
the replica-of-the-artist’s-intention-in-the-head-of-the-audience actually
corresponds to the intention-in-the-head-of-the-artist, because there is
no direct access to it, only access through the ‘encoding’, so to speak,
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of it in the physical object; and any cases of misunderstanding seem to
lend support to this ‘in principle’ scepticism, which also besets our contemporary ‘intentionalist’ theories, such as Wollheim’s or Levinson’s.38
(Notice that this means that Wollheim’s own positive theses do not entirely avoid the difficulty he raised himself as (d) above.) At all events,
the problem with Bosanquet’s position has to do with the fact that he
did not explain how it is that the aesthetic feeling or emotion can be
shared, since he appealed in his criticism of Croce to a view of language
where ‘meanings’ remain essentially private. I think that Collingwood
consciously devised his aesthetic theory, which has recently been called,
rightly, a ‘performance’ theory,39 to avoid this pitfall (showing that it
successfully avoids it would be another story).
In The Principles of Art, Collingwood never discussed openly Croce’s
aesthetics so that one could see clearly what he took from it and what
he rejected. As I read Collingwood, however, his aesthetic theory is
consonant with Bosanquet’s criticisms of Croce’s. Even his old teacher
Carritt, who had become enamoured with Croce, pointed out that the
Italian’s concept of expression is “not communication” and that, with it,
we would remain “confined to ourselves” (Carritt 1932, 90-91). The
worry would then be – not a ‘post-modern’ one for sure – that one
would not be in a position adequately to explain how the artist and her
audience could share anything through the work of art. Collingwood
was acutely aware of this and expressed himself very clearly in The
Principles of Art:
The aesthetic experience in itself, we are assuming, is in
both cases a purely inward experience, taking place wholly
in the mind of the person who enjoys it. But this inward experience is supposed to stand in a double relation to something outward or bodily. (a) For the artist, the inward experience may be externalized or converted into a perceptible
object; though there is no intrinsic reason why it should
be. (b) For the audience, there is a converse process: the
outward experience comes first, and this is converted into
that inward experience which alone is aesthetic. (. . . ) if
aesthetic experience in the artist is something wholly independent of such outward things, but in the audience is
something dependent upon them and derived in contem-
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plation of them, how is it an experience of the same kind in
the two cases, and how is there any communication? (Collingwood 1938, 301-302)
His own view on this matter was, on the contrary, that, in the case
here of painting, the audience’s experience is “identical with that of
the painter” (Collingwood 1938, 308). Clearly, the English were ill at
ease with certain aspects of Croce and were not buying it wholesale.
That meant, however, that one would have to provide the theoretical
underpinnings necessary for sharing. The whole of The Principles of
Art, Book II is indeed devoted to ‘imagination’, and this sounds rather
Crocean, but he develops in that book a philosophy of language, further improved later on in his last book, The New Leviathan, which is not
only decidedly not Crocean, but also more interesting than the model of
language appealed to by Bosanquet in his criticisms of Croce. In other
words, the basis for Collingwood’s theory is not lifted from Croce, and
the difference is, again, an essential one, since it amounts to a repudiation of the ‘ideal’ theory set forth in (a)-(c). What follows involves a
lot of silent reconstruction of Collingwood’s thoughts on these issues,
which were still evolving at the time of his early death at the age of 53
in 1943, so the reader should beware not to try to find it fully developed in earlier works such as The Idea of History (Collingwood 1994),
mostly written by 1936, or even fully developed in The Principles of Art,
completed in 1938.40
3. COLLINGWOOD’S AESTHETICS

Perhaps the best way to understand Collingwood’s late views on language and art is to understand them in the broader context in which
they are inserted, contrasting them with the theory from which they
evolved. My overall understanding of the evolution of Collingwood’s
philosophy is that, after being schooled in ‘Oxford Realism’ prior to
the first world war, he became an ‘idealist’, but that in the late 1930s,
he gradually shed a good deal of this ‘idealist’ heritage, moving to
his mature views (which he never fully developed before his untimely
death).41 Thus, Speculum Mentis (Collingwood 1924) and An Essay on
Philosophical Method (Collingwood 2005) provide the best expression
of his ‘idealism’. The precise nature of the latter is still a matter of deVol. 4: 200 Years of Analytical Philosophy
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bate, but it is clear that it was of a highly original form. For example,
his ‘dialectic’ of the mind as a ‘scale of forms’ in Speculum Mentis was
an ambitious system, moving from the pure ‘stream’ of sensations to rational action, and integrating as stages art, religion, science, philosophy
and history. A simplified version of its ‘psychological’ side would look
like this:42
Choice
(From capricious choice to rational action)
|
Second-level consciousness
(Higher-order emotions, e.g., anger, and desires)
|
First-level consciousness or ‘awareness’
|
Stream of sensations
In a nutshell, out of the ‘stream’ of sensations, the agent becomes
aware of her surroundings and her own emotional reaction to it, in turn,
she might develop her own higher-order emotions (or ‘emotions of the
intellect’ as Collingwood put it), e.g., feeling angry because of her own
feeling of shame, and her own desires. Then comes time to choose of all
of these which to pursue, given her understanding of her own situation.
In order to assist in moving from one level to another, one finds theoretical activities. For example, The New Leviathan contains a lengthy
discussion of the use of philosophical and historical thinking in order
for the agent to choose, of the possibilities offered, one’s ‘duty’, i.e.,
the ‘rational’ action par excellence (Collingwood 1992, chap. XIII-XVIII).
The original place of art is at the first-level consciousness or ‘awareness’,
where ‘imagination’ is needed in order to achieve ‘expression’ of one’s
feelings with regard to the events one is living through. The idea seems
to be that the agent becomes ‘aware’ through ‘attention’ of parts of her
total ‘stream’ of sensations, but that these sensations always come with
an emotional charge,43 but the latter, however, might be too painful
for the agent fully to recognize and accept as her own, so she would
disown it. So the process of becoming aware of one’s basic emotional
response to events in one’s life might fail, and result in a strange situation in which the agent feels some emotions but disowns them, i.e., she
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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refuses to recognize that she feels what she feels. Collingwood calls this
situation the ‘corruption of consciousness’. He describes it almost using
Hume’s terms for the passage from sense-impressions to ideas:
First, we direct our attention towards a certain feeling, or
become conscious of it. Then, we take fright at what we
have recognized: not because the feeling, as an impression,
is an alarming impression, but because the idea into which
we are converting it proves an alarming idea. We cannot
see our way to dominate it, and shrink from persevering in
the attempt. We therefore give it up, and turn our attention
to something less intimidating . . . I call this the ‘corruption’
of consciousness; because consciousness permits itself to be
bribed or corrupted in the discharge of its function, being
distracted from a formidable task towards an easier one.
(Collingwood 1938, 217)
Collingwood considered ‘corruption of consciousness’ unhealthy and
potentially dangerous:
Unless consciousness does its work successfully, the facts
which it offers to intellect, the only things upon which intellect can build its fabric of thought, are false from the
beginning. A truthful consciousness gives intellect a firm
foundation upon which to build; a corrupt consciousness
forces intellect to build on a quicksand. The falsehoods
which an untruthful consciousness imposes on the intellect
are falsehoods which intellect can never correct for itself. In
so far as consciousness is corrupted, the very wells of truth
are poisoned. Intellect can build nothing firm. Moral ideals are castles in the air. Political and economic systems are
mere cobwebs. Even common sanity and bodily health are
no longer secure. [. . . ] Just as the life of a community depends for its very existence on honest dealing between man
and man, the guardianship of this honesty being vested in
any one class or section, but in all and sundry, so the effort
towards expression of emotions, the effort to overcome corruption of consciousness, is an effort that has to be made
not by specialists only but by every one who uses language,
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whenever he uses it. Every utterance and every gesture that
each one of us makes is a work of art. It is important to each
one of us that in making them, however much he deceives
others, he should not deceive himself. If he deceives himself
in this matter he has sown in himself a seed which, unless
he roots it up again, may grow into any kind of wickedness,
any kind of mental disease, any kind of stupidity and folly
and insanity. Bad art, the corrupt consciousness, is the true
radix malorum. (Collingwood 1938, 284-285)
(As I said, I shall come back to the social dimension.) Thus, one needs to
recognize one’s own emotions in order properly to cope with them and
avoid disastrous consequences. Perhaps Benjamin Constant’s Adolphe
could serve here as a literary illustration of Collingwood’s ideas, although he does not mention it; his references here are the obvious ones:
Spinoza and Freud.44 He probably got the idea, however, from Croce,
who wrote:
By working on our impressions we liberate ourselves. By
bringing them as objects before our mind, we detach them
from ourselves and raise ourselves above them. The liberating and purifying function of art is another aspect of its
character as an activity. Activity is a liberator precisely because it drives out passivity. (Croce 1992, 22)
The distinction between activity and passivity is already here a reference to Spinoza on passio and actio, as Collingwood makes clear:
This corruption of consciousness has already been described
by psychologists in their own way. The disowning of experiences they call repression; the ascription of these to
other persons, projection; their consolidation into a mass
of experience, homogeneous in itself (as it well may be,
if the disowning is systematically done), dissociation; and
the building-up of a bowdlerized experience which we will
admit to be our own, fantasy-building. They have shown,
too, the disastrous effect which these corruptions of consciousness have, if they become habitual, on the person suffering from them. The same lesson was taught long ago by
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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Spinoza, who has expounded better than any other man the
conception of the truthful consciousness and its importance
as a foundation for a healthy mental life. The problem of
ethics, for him, is the question how man, being ridden by
feelings, can so muster them that his life, from being a continuous passio, an undergoing of things, can become a conscious actio, or doing of things. The answer he gives is a
curiously simple one. [. . . ] As soon as we form a clear and
distinct idea of a passion, it ceases to be a passion. (Collingwood 1938, 218-219)
For Collingwood the role of art is to help in the fight against this ‘corruption of consciousness’ through the imaginative expression of one’s
emotions.45 Here, I can do no better than to quote the beautiful concluding paragraph of The Principles of Art:
[Art] must be prophetic. The artist must prophesy not in the
sense that he foretells things to come, but in the sense that
he tells his audience, at risk of their displeasure, the secrets
of their own hearts. His business as an artist is to speak
out, to make a clean breast. But what he has to utter is not,
as the individualistic theory of art would have us think, his
own secrets. As spokesman of his community, the secrets
he must utter are theirs. The reason why they need him
is that no community altogether knows its own heart; and
by failing in this knowledge a community deceives itself on
the one subject concerning which ignorance means death.
For the evils which come from that ignorance the poet as
prophet suggests no remedy, because he has already given
one. The remedy is the poem itself. Art is the community’s
medicine for the worst disease of mind, the corruption of
consciousness. (Collingwood 1938, 336)
I shall come back in the concluding remarks to Collingwood’s conception of the social role of the artist, a conception that prefigures nicely Iris
Murdoch’s views in The Sovereignty of Good over other Concepts (Murdoch 1967).46 For the moment, I should point out that Collingwood
could never be in a position to tell us that art could play a fundamental
social role if he did not have a credible explanation of the possibility
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for members of a community to share emotions through art; this thesis
about the social role of art thus re-enforces the above point about the
need to provide an explanation of art that shows how the artist and the
audience share something through the work of art. This is precisely the
main task of Books II and III of his Principles of Art, a book seldom read
by those who have taken for granted Wollheim’s characterization and
critique of the ‘Croce-Collingwood’ theory, whose sole textual basis is,
as we saw, Book I.
One should note further, that Collingwood did not define art as ‘expression of emotion’; not just as an activity (as opposed to a state) but
as a cognitive activity, i.e., as
. . . an activity by which we become conscious of our own
emotions. (Collingwood 1938, 292)
Theoretically, the artist is a person who comes to know himself, to know his own emotions. (Collingwood 1938, 291)
The activity which generates an artistic experience is the
activity of consciousness. This rules out all theories of art
which place its origin in sensation or its emotions. (Collingwood 1938, 273)47
This is a key difference easily overlooked by hasty critics.48 Incidentally,
this last quotation is but a silent repudiation of Croce. Again, one must
recall the above overall system in which the philosophy of art is embedded: this embedding defines the primary focus of art for Collingwood’s
theory as a cognitive one.49
To come back to Collingwood’s overall system, one might comment
generally on the foregoing by pointing out that there is hardly any
‘Hegelian’ orthodoxy here; as a matter of fact, the influence of Croce
over the overall structure of this system is clear. What about the details?
Of course, this is not the place for a full investigation, nor for a discussion of the numerous questions it raises. But some details are worth
highlighting. First, a small point concerning the movement from the
‘stream’ of sensations to the ‘first-level of consciousness’, through ‘attention’. The idea is of course lifted from psychology,50 but one should note
that Collingwood went over his whole system in a compressed manner
in Part I of The New Leviathan, making substantial modifications that
indicate a move towards a more fully linguistic standpoint:
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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[. . . ] fix your mind on the point at issue, and you see that
the practical act of naming your feeling is what sets you off
being conscious of it. (Collingwood 1992, 6.27)
There could therefore be no pre-linguistic level other than the pure
‘stream of sensations’, and all consciousness is already of a linguistic
nature. Therefore, there is no room for an emotion of which one would
be conscious without it being also expressed linguistically. A particularity of Collingwood’s notion of language is rather broad and covers not
only speech but
[. . . ] any system of bodily movements, not necessarily vocal, whereby the men who make them mean or signify anything. (Collingwood 1992, 6.1)51
This is why he called dance “the mother of all languages” (Collingwood 1938, 244 & 246). Placed as it is at the earliest stage of levels
of consciousness presented above, art becomes ubiquitous, and if the
‘artistic activity’ is one of ‘expression of emotions’ (in the peculiar sense
explained above), then it is simply co-extensive with language as just
defined (Collingwood 1938, 273 & 275). This is also as clear as any
an indication that Collingwood’s views leave no room for a conception
of art for which the work of art is, to compress (a) and (c) above, an
inner state of the artist, which need not be externalized: this is clearly
impossible in the case of dance. As Collingwood himself pointed out,
this does not mean, of course, that there could not be any case in which
the work of art is at first a purely internal state, e.g., in the case of a
poem imagined by the poet only in thought. But that only shows that
Collingwood is not making a claim of an essentialist nature about art.
He is not claiming, e.g., in passages such as (Collingwood 1938, 151)
quoted above, that the work of art is always, only that it may be at first
an inner state of the artist.
There is another reason why Wollheim could not be right in his portrayal of Collingwood, which has to do with the fact that ‘art is language’.52 What this means is that the conditions for linguistic understanding apply mutatis mutandis in the case of the interpretation of the
work of art. This is why The Principles of Art contains a lengthy chapter
on language and understanding (Collingwood 1938, 225-269), providing him with an account of the possibility of sharing an emotion through
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art. In this chapter, Collingwood develops a highly original conception
of language, pointing out that self-consciousness emerges along with
the consciousness of others and thus a discovery is the discovery of the
self as a speaker and a hearer:

other person. Understanding what some one says to you is
thus attributing to him the idea which his words arouse in
yourself; and this implies treating them as words of your
own. (Collingwood 1938, 249-250)

Consciousness does not begin as a mere self-consciousness,
[. . . ] and then proceed by some process [. . . ] to construct
or infer other persons. Each one of us is a finite being, surrounded by others of the same kind; and the consciousness
of our own existence is also the consciousness of the existence of these others. [. . . ] the child’s discovery of itself
as a person is also its discovery of itself as a member of a
world of persons. [. . . ] The discovery of myself as a person
is the discovery that I can speak, and am thus a persona or
speaker; in speaking, I am both speaker and hearer; and
since the discovery of myself as a person is also the discovery of other persons around me, it is the discovery of speakers and hearers other than myself. Thus, from the first, the
experience of speech contains in itself in principle the experiences of speaking to others and of hearing others speak to
me. (Collingwood 1938, 248-249)

The hearer understands the speaker in the same way she understands
herself and, at the same time, she attributes the idea which she understands to the speaker. The conceptions expounded in these rich
passages certainly deserve commentary and critical assessment. But
it suffices for the purposes of this paper that the reader realizes that
Collingwood’s position is underpinned by a highly original view of language. This highly original conception has been praised by contemporary analytic philosophers as varied as Simon Blackburn, who saw in it
a forerunner to the modern simulation theory in psychology (Blackburn
1992), and Donald Davidson, who saw in it a forerunner of his own
‘triangulation’ (Davidson 2001, 219). Who is right is of no importance
here, but one thing is sure: one could not say of it that it was retrograde
for the 1930s. It is exactly the contrary, so much so that, as a matter of
fact, it fell on deaf ears. In the context of this paper, one should insist
here on the fact that there is no equivalent in Croce’s conceptions (or
Bosanquet’s). Not only is it clear that (a)-(c) do not characterize his position, it would be just wrong to claim (d), i.e., that with Collingwood
the link between the artist and the audience is severed. I shall insist on
this in my concluding remarks.

Understanding thus takes place as the result of a re-centring of the
hearer as the speaker, which is possible because language is devoid of
any asymmetry imposed by some first-person privilege:
The expression [of emotion] is speech, and the speaker is
his own first hearer. As hearing himself speak he is conscious of himself as possessor of the idea which he hears
himself expressing. [. . . ] we describe [. . . ] our situation
as hearers of what we ourselves say. The person to whom
speech is addressed is already familiar with this double situation. [. . . ] The hearer [. . . ] conscious that he is being
addressed by another person like himself [. . . ], takes what
he hears exactly as if it were speech of his own: he speaks
to himself with the words that he hears addressed to him,
and thus constructs in himself the idea which those words
express. At the same time, being conscious of the speaker as
a person other than himself, he attributes that idea to this
www.thebalticyearbook.org

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE SOCIAL ROLE OF ART

To conclude, I would like to come back to the social role of art. As I
pointed out, Collingwood wanted art to play an essential social role,
that of the “community’s medicine for the worst disease of mind, the
corruption of consciousness” (Collingwood 1938, 336). Historians of
philosophy often operate with the erroneous idea that philosophers,
reasoning as they do in some ethereal, eternal medium, are never conditioned by their context. Collingwood, who rightly thought the idea
absurd, tells us in the preface to The Principles of Art:
Everything written in this book has been written in the belief that it has practical bearing, direct or indirect, upon the
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condition of art in England in 1937. (Collingwood 1938,
vi)
The book was published on the eve of the Munich agreement in 1938, at
a time when Collingwood, who had until then lived the secluded life of
an Oxford don, became much more politicized (some of the ‘appeasers’
were his colleagues at Oxford, and that gravely upset him).53 The context of “the condition of art in England in 1937” is also the condition
of a country that could not see that it was its duty to react to the rise
of Nazism and fascism. He believed that one of the gravest defects of
democracies was, in contrast with the totalitarian states, their inability to raise emotional support and this is what he expressed by talking
about a “corruption of consciousness” at the level of the community.
British citizens appeared to him to be incapable of the sorts of emotions
needed for a healthy democratic life and he believed that the defect
was partly due to the sorry state of the arts in his own country. If anything art should have but did not bring out into the open the sorts of
emotions needed for support of democracy as a decisive conflict was
drawing near. He thus believed that it is the artist’s task to take the lead
here and to succeed in expressing an emotion, which will be shared by
the community, a ‘common feeling’ as Bosanquet would have said. At
bottom, therefore, Collingwood’s philosophy of art is intimately related
to his political philosophy. This remark illustrates my point:
It is clear, then, on my own premises, that an artist with
strong political views and feelings will be to that extent
better qualified to produce works of art than one without.
(Collingwood 1938, 279)
As I pointed out, in order simply to have a story to tell, he needed a
credible explanation of how it is possible for members of a community
to share an emotion through a work of art. He first argues in a rather
realist manner that the emotion put into the work of art by the artist
and the emotion felt by the audience are identical:
If the artist paints his picture in such a way that we, when
we look at it using our imagination, find ourselves enjoying an . . . experience . . . like that which he enjoyed when
painting it, there is not much sense in saying that we bring

www.thebalticyearbook.org

30

British Idealist Aesthetics

this experience with us to the picture and do not find it
there. The artist, if we told him that, would laugh at us and
assure us that what we believed ourselves to have read into
the picture was just what he put there. (Collingwood 1938,
150)54
This is certainly a controversial claim, anti-post-modern as it is, which
needs to be buttressed by arguments that Collingwood developed within
his philosophy of history, about the possibility for the historian of ‘reenacting’ a thought identical to that of the historical agent she studies.55 (Perhaps an ‘identity theory’ of truth is presupposed here.)56 More
interestingly perhaps, there is a related argument derived from his philosophy of language, which was briefly outlined above, with the help of
a few quotations. As we saw, Collingwood saw language as free from
any form of asymmetry between speaker and hearer, so that they could
trade places. This view is simply extended to art, where the exchangeability of perspectives between the artist and his audience is made into
a precondition for understanding. Collingwood’s position on emotions
has become truly ‘linguistic’:
The relation between speaker and hearer, as two distinct
persons, is one which, because of its very familiarity, is easily misunderstood. We are apt to think of it as one in which
the speaker ‘communicates’ his emotions to the hearer. But
emotions cannot be shared like food or drink, or handed
over like old clothes. [. . . ] independently of language neither he nor I nor any third person can compare his emotions
with mine, so as to find out whether they are like or unlike.
If we speak of such comparison, we speak of something that
is done by the use of language; so that the comparison must
be defined in terms of speaking and hearing, not speaking
and hearing in terms of such comparison. (Collingwood
1938, 249)
And the same goes for art:
If what [the artist] wishes to do is to express his emotions
intelligibly, he has to express them in such a way as to be
intelligible to himself; his audience is then in the position of
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persons who overhear him doing this. (Collingwood 1938,
111)
If some one says ‘Twice two is four’ in the hearing of some
one incapable of carrying out the simplest arithmetical operation, he will be understood by himself, but not by his
hearer. The hearer can understand only if he can add two
and two in his own mind. Whether he could do it before
he heard the speaker say those words makes no difference.
What is here said of expressing thoughts is equally true of
expressing emotions. If a poet expresses, for example, a certain kind of fear, the only hearers who can understand him
are those who are capable of experiencing that kind of fear
themselves. Hence, when some one reads and understands
a poem he is not merely understanding the poet’s expression of his [own] emotions, he is expressing emotions of
his own in the poet’s words, which have thus become his
own words. As Coleridge put it, we know a man for a poet
by the fact that he makes us poets. We know that he is expressing his emotions by the fact that he is enabling us to
express ours. (Collingwood 1938, 118)
This conception has far reaching consequences. Foremost is the idea
that artist and audience collaborate in the work of art, i.e., as with linguistic meaning, the experience of sharing an emotion is never fully
belonging to only one of the two. This view, which is still very much
avant-garde today, is clearly a consequence of his philosophy of language:
The aesthetic activity is the activity of speaking. Speech is
speech only so far as it is both spoken and heard. A man
may, no doubt, speak to himself and be his own hearer;
but what he says to himself is in principle capable of being
said to any one sharing his language. As a finite being,
man becomes aware of himself as a person only so far as
he finds himself standing in relation to others of whom he
simultaneously becomes aware as persons. And there is no
point in his life at which a man has finished becoming aware
of himself as a person. [. . . ] If he has a new emotion, he
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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must express it to others, in order that, finding them able
to share it, he may be sure his consciousness of it is not
corrupt.
This is not inconsistent with the doctrine, stated elsewhere
in this book, that the aesthetic experience or aesthetic activity is one which goes on in the artist’s mind. The experience
of being listened to is an experience which goes on in the
mind of the speaker, although in order to its existence a
listener is necessary, so that the activity is a collaboration.
Mutual love is a collaborative activity; but the experience
of this activity in the mind of each lover taken singly is a
different experience from that of loving and being spurned.
(Collingwood 1938, 317-318)
Finally, one should note that Collingwood truly believed that art is
an activity that belongs to a community, not that of an isolated individual:
[The artistic activity] is a corporate activity belonging not
to any one human being but to a community. It is performed not only by the man whom we individualistically
call the artist, but partly by all the other artists of whom
we speak as ‘influencing’ him, where we really mean collaborating with him. It is performed not only by this corporate body of artists, but (in the case of arts of performance)
by executants, who are not merely acting under the artist’s
orders, but are collaborating with him to produce the finished work. And even now the activity of artistic creation
is not complete; for that, there must be an audience, whose
function is therefore not a merely a receptive one but collaborative too. The artist (although under the spell of individualistic prejudice he may try to deny it) stands thus
in collaborative relations with an entire community; not an
ideal community of all human beings as such, but the actual
community of fellow artists from whom he borrows, executants whom he employs, and audience to whom he speaks.
(Collingwood 1938, 324)

Vol. 4: 200 Years of Analytical Philosophy

33

Chinatsu Kobayashi

This view has many controversial implications, some of which are drawn
out by Collingwood, e.g., about the need to abolish the copyright law
(Collingwood 1938, 325-326), his apology for the avant-garde and rather
left-wing Group Theatre in London (Collingwood 1938, 329), his praise
of Louis MacNiece and T. S. Eliot (Collingwood 1938, 332-335),57 or
this simple comment, which sounds as if written no more than a few
years ago:
We must face the fact that every performer is of necessity
a co-author, and develop its implications. (Collingwood
1938, 328)
Again, this is not the place for a discussion of these issues, but at least
they serve to illustrate the originality, radical nature and modernity of
Collingwood’s views. And the reader will have at least noticed how
far we are now from the so-called ‘Croce-Collingwood’ theory, as none
of this makes any sense on this construal of Collingwood. Not only is it
false that with Collingwood the link between the artist and the audience
is severed, but rather he argued the contrary in a most original manner!
The ‘Croce-Collingwood’ theory served for generations as a pretext not
to read this rather provocative philosopher, who definitely deserves a
hearing.58
Notes
1
Recall that Ruskin made his reputation by his early defense of Turner, and that he
was through his writings instrumental in the rise and popularity of the ‘pre-Raphaelite’
movement in painting, the neo-Gothic movement in architecture, and, through his influence on the ‘Arts & Crafts’ movement of William Morris, the whole of ‘Art Nouveau’.
But all these were rejected by the ‘modernist’ movement and Ruskin’s reputation faded
very quickly. It is quite striking, on the other hand, that the last chapter of Bosanquet’s A
History of Aesthetics (Bosanquet 1904) is devoted in large part to Ruskin.
2
For example, see Clive Bell’s Art, published in 1914, whose concept of ‘significant
form’ (defined as a ‘combination of lines and colours’) influenced Fry and became a key
contribution to 20th century ‘formalism’, despite the shortcomings of Bell’s positions. It is
perhaps worth noting in the context of this paper the link between ‘significant form’ and
‘aesthetic emotion’ in Bell’s original proposal. Indeed, Bell defined ‘aesthetic emotion’
in a circular manner as the emotion provoked by works of art (Bell 1928, 6), and then
defined ‘significant form’ as the quality possessed by all objects that provoke an ‘aesthetic
emotion’, i.e., by all objects that are works of art (Bell 1928, 7-8 & 12). This view owes
much to G. E. Moore’s intuitionism, see (Lang 1964) and (Dean 1996).
3
For a survey, see (Sweet 2001).
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4
Bosanquet’s main writings on aesthetics are (Bosanquet 1904, 1915). In this paper,
I shall focus on his later critique of Croce in (Bosanquet 1920a) and (Bosanquet 1920b);
the latter is a rejoinder to Carr’s critique of the former in (Carr 1920). His History of Aesthetics is rather narrow in focus, but interesting as a unique English-language treatment
of 19th century German contributions. As Bosanquet later remarked about his book: “This
was simply Hegel’s narrative of the facts. I took it, and still take it, to be obvious and true.
I held myself to be merely dotting the i’s and crossing the t’s of a simple insight” (Bosanquet 1920b, 212). For critical reviews of the 1893 edition that point out this bias as a
major weakness, see (Dewey 1893) and (Sully 1893). As for Collingwood, I shall focus
on The Principles of Art (Collingwood 1938), neglecting the more Hegelian, narrower in
scope and less original Outlines of a Philosophy of Art (Collingwood 1925). His papers on
aesthetics were collected in (Collingwood 1964).
5
Collingwood was a pianist and a draughtsman, coming from a remarkably artistic
background (his father, who also wrote novels, was Ruskin’s secretary). For a biography,
see (Inglis 2009).
6
See (Carritt 1932, 1949). Carritt had also published an anthology, The Philosophy of
Beauty in 1931 (Carritt 1931). On Carritt, see (Saw 1963). For Croce, see his Aesthetics
as Science of Expression and General Linguistics (Croce 1922), to be discussed below. The
first theoretical part of that book was translated anew and published as (Croce 1992), the
edition that I shall use. It may come as a surprise, but the Italian neo-Hegelians exerted
a strong influence at Oxford in the 1920s and 1930s, including on late figures such as E.
F. Carritt and H. J. Paton and, only to an extent, on Collingwood.
7
It will not be possible to discuss here Collingwood’s notion of ‘re-enactment’ as it
applies to the interpretation of the work of art. It certainly prefigured Richard Wollheim’s
view of art criticism as ‘retrieval’ (Wollheim 1980, 185-204). For the connection with
Baxandall, see his Patterns of Intention, chapter I, especially (Baxandall 1985, 139 n.1).
Baxandall’s study of Piero della Francesca’s Baptism of the Christ in chapter IV is a very
good example of ‘re-enactment’ or ‘retrieval’ at work (Baxandall 1985, 105-137). As for
Wittgenstein, it is not clear what sort of influence he could have had on Baxandall.
8
The idea was also suggested independently by John Dewey in Art as Experience
(Dewey 1934) a few years earlier than Collingwood. But, as we shall see, Collingwood,
not Dewey, devised an interesting philosophy of language to explain this.
9
Collingwood’s distinction in The Principles of Art between ‘art’ and ‘craft’ (Collingwood 1938, 15-41) has been criticized from a loosely ‘Wittgensteinian’ standpoint as a
form of essentialism concerning what is claimed to be a ‘family-resemblance’ or ‘open’
concept. (One must recall here that this point was never made by Wittgenstein himself,
but originates in (Weitz 1956).) That this is a complete misunderstanding of Collingwood’s rather rich discussion (he has six variants for a possible distinction and makes
clear that it is porous, so that he is not committed to a form of essentialism), is explained
in (Ridley 1998). See (Carroll 1998, 49-78) for an extended critical discussion.
10
For example, the essays collected in Aesthetics and Language, introduced as “attempts
to diagnose and clarify some aesthetic confusions” (Elton 1959, 1). One recurring theme
in that book is the ‘dullness’ or ‘dreariness’ of the old ‘idealist’ aesthetics. With hindsight,
this is bound to appear as a strange comment, as these essays also strike one as hardly
less dull or dreary.
11
See (Spadoni 1984).
12
I use here the second, augmented edition (Wollheim 1980). Again, British contribu-
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tions to art criticism must not be ignored, for example, E. H. Gombrich’s Art and Illusion,
first published in 1960 (Gombrich 1961).
13
It is worth noting here that, paradoxically, Wollheim began his career with writings
on British Idealism. For example, see (Wollheim 1959)
14
For example, at (Wollheim 1980, 36, 80, 114-117). The expression ‘Croce-Collingwood
Theory’ is not his, however, as it was used already in the 1950s, see (Hospers 1956),
(Donagan 1958).
15
Wollheim also developed a further argument against Collingwood on the basis of the
type-token distinction (Wollheim 1980, 74f.), which he sharpened in a later paper, with
the introduction of a distinction between ‘art-type’ (poems, music), and ‘art-particular’
(sculpture, painting): his claim is that Collingwood did not draw the distinction and that
his views are at best applicable only to ‘art-type’ (Wollheim 1972). As Wollheim points
out, Collingwood wrote that “a work of art may be completely created when it has been
created as a thing whose only place is in the artist’s mind” (Collingwood 1938, 134),
and one must grant to him that this claim may arguably fit ‘art-type’ such as music but
does not transfer to ‘art-particular’ such as painting. A full rejoinder to this argument
falls outside the scope of this paper. One should at least note here that Collingwood
makes that very claim only for music or poetry, e.g., at (Collingwood 1938, 132, 151),
although he is indeed confused at (Collingwood 1938, 134), where he mentions pictures
alongside tunes and poems. As for ‘art-particular’, Collingwood’s discussion of painting
(Collingwood 1938, 144-148) leaves no room for the view (see below) that the work of
art could be at any stage only ‘in the head of the artist’. So Wollheim has not shown that
Collingwood is confused because he did not draw a distinction between ‘art-type’ and
‘art-particular’ (he seems rather to assume it implicitly in most passages), and even less
that he held the ‘ideal’ theory: there is clearly no room for it in the case of ‘art-particular’
and in the case of ‘art-type’, it is clear that there is a perfectly legitimate sense in which
on can say that a musician can compose a tune ‘in his head’, that does not lend support to
the ‘ideal’ theory: so to infer commitment to the latter on the basis of claiming the former
is a non sequitur.
16
The point is even to be found already in (Dewey 1934).
17
For example, all the possible clichés about the ‘Croce-Collingwood’ theory are rehashed in (Mulhall 1992), which looks as if written with no first-hand knowledge of
these authors.
18
See also (Grant 1987), which makes similar points, and the more recent (Davies
2008). There is an earlier critique of Wollheim’s reading of Collingwood in (Sclafani
1976) but it seems to have had no impact.
19
One important argument concerns the claim, to put in non-Collingwoodian terms,
that the link between the artefact and the artist’s intention is, according to Collingwood,
necessary, not contingent (Ridley 1997, 265f.). See also (Grant 1987, 244f.) for an earlier
defence of that point. If this is the case, then the claim that Collingwood held the ‘ideal’
theory is largely undermined, since it depends on severing that link.
20
See also (Collingwood 1938, 282). The view was also, prior to Collingwood, Alexander’s. See, e.g., (Alexander 1933, 59 & 134), (Alexander 1939, 214 & 219).
21
In a nutshell, Collingwood was not so much making an ontological point as he was
arguing all along for a theory of the work of art as activity or performance. This point
cannot be agued for here but see (Davies 2008).
22
I fear that this sort of mistake is perpetuated again in the most recent attempt at
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vindicating Wollheim’s reading of Collingwood in (Kemp 2003).
23
E.g., at (Collingwood 1938, 139).
24
I take this expression from (Ridley 1997, 265).
25
See (Saari 1989) and (D’Oro 2000).
26
As Grant put it, there is a ‘trump’ in Book III at (Collingwood 1938, 305), on which
defenders of Wollheim’s reading insist heavily (Grant 1987, 243), ((Kemp 2003, 1983).
But a detailed discussion of this passage falls outside the scope of this paper.
27
This line of argument is developed throughout (Grant 1987), only, however, in part
against Wollheim’s reading.
28
A few years after Art and its Objects Wollheim went on to publish a paper entitled ‘On
an Alleged Inconsistency in Collingwood’s Aesthetic’, in which he simply refused to recognize the ‘dialectical’ nature of Collingwood’s argument and insisted on taking his remarks
at face value, thus claiming to have found an inconsistency in Collingwood (Wollheim
1972, 69). Wollheim also claims that “the view that Collingwood advances in Book III of
The Principles of Art is so very fragmentary” (Wollheim 1972, 77) in order to discount it,
and to insist on the claim that only the views expressed in Book I are to be assessed.
29
For the reasons for this strange situation, see (Knox 1969, 165).
30
I have in mind (Kemp 2003).
31
In this, Collingwood is indeed closer to Croce, as can be seen from the place already
allotted to art in Speculum Mentis (Collingwood 1925).
32
See also (Croce 1992, 8).
33
It is worth noting en passant that, if this ‘expression’ is already ‘art’, then “each of
us, in short, is in some small measure a painter, sculptor, musician, poet, prose writer”
(Croce 1992, 11). Indeed, Collingwood also argued for a similar sounding conclusion in
The Principles of Art, when he wrote: “Every utterance and each gesture that each one
of us makes is a work of art” (Collingwood 1938, 172). We shall see, however, that his
argument does not rely on such premises.
34
On the identification of language and art see (de Mauro 1965), chapter IV. However,
I wish to steer clear here of any discussion concerning the proper interpretation of Croce’s
philosophy of language and its value for linguistics. Although I doubt that there is any, it
is interesting to note with Tullio de Mauro’s book that there used to be a Crocean tradition
in Italian linguistics, via Giovanni Gentile and his students.
35
The same point is made in Three Lectures on Aesthetics, (Bosanquet 1915, 67-68).
36
On should note, however, that Alexander’s critique of Croce is rather analogous
to Bosanquet’s, as he also points out the deficiencies in Croce’s underlying conception
of ‘intuition’ as being prior to language and purely private (Alexander 1933, 132-134),
(Alexander 1939, 219-220).
37
This in turn is grounded in his metaphysics of the Absolute as an infinite completion
and fusion of finite minds, but there is really no need to get into this. (See (Lang 1968,
380-382).) Certainly, this ‘Hegelian’ aspect of Bosanquet’s philosophy has been out of
date for quite a while. There is no equivalent appeal to an ‘Absolute’ in Collingwood.
38
See (Wollheim 1987) and the essays collected in (Levinson 1996, 2006). This is, of
course, a bold claim to assert without argument, but any discussion would lead us too far
afield.
39
See (Davies 2008, 168). Of course, the ‘performance’ theory of the work of art is
controversial, like any other theory, but it cannot be said to belong to a bygone ‘idealist’
era. For a recent defence, see (Davies 2004).
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40
There are indeed numerous issues raised here by scholars about which I need to
remain silent. For example, Alan Donagan saw a ‘lapse into associationism’ in The New
Leviathan (Donagan 1962, 54-56), where I claim, below, that Collingwood advanced beyond psychology towards a fully linguistic point of view.
41
For Collingwood’s own account of his evolution, see his Autobiography (Collingwood
1939).
42
For a fuller diagram, see (Mink 1969, 117).
43
On attention, (Collingwood 1938, 203sq.), (Collingwood 1992, 4.5-4.6), on sensations and their emotional charges, see (Collingwood 1938, 232), (Collingwood 1992, 4.1
& 4.62). These remarks properly belong to the sphere of psychology. Alas, Collingwood
does not cite any source, but he was clearly not a fabulator. For example, the notion
of ‘attention’ and the idea that sensations always come with an emotional charge were
introduced in British psychology by James Ward in his celebrated entry on ‘Psychology’ to
the 9th edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica, and are to be found, alongside other ideas
about higher-level emotions, etc. in his late opus, Psychological Principles (Ward 1918).
There are also in Collingwood numerous references to William James, e.g., a dismissal of
his theory of emotion in (Collingwood 1938, 232-233).
44
There are precious few traces of psychoanalysis in Collingwood’s background. However, Herbert Read had already integrated ideas by Freud in Art and Society, published
in 1936 (Read 1966, 82-95), and it is rather likely that Collingwood read it. He certainly knew about psychoanalysis first-hand: in order to comply with his principle that
one should not speak about an activity without having practiced it, he underwent a full
psychoanalysis. (He was a draughtsman, whose drawings of Latin stone inscriptions of
Britain have been published, and a pianist, so thought he could speak with knowledge
about art; as for his philosophy of history, he was also the foremost archaeologist and
historian of Roman Britain of his generation.) His colleague John Mabbott commented
wryly on Collingwood’s “full fifty sessions” of psychoanalysis: “I fear it did him serious
harm” (Mabbott 1986, 76).
45
One is of course not far from ‘catharsis’. Collingwood was aware of this, see (Collingwood 1938, 110).
46
As pointed out in (Davies 2008, 173). On another note, one should also note the
connexions with Herbert Read’s views in his 1936 book Art and Society (Read 1966, 95).
47
It is clear, however, from what he says elsewhere in the book and in The New
Leviathan, that Collingwood really conceived this “activity of consciousness” to be of a
linguistic nature.
48
This is pointed out in (Davies 2008, 173).
49
It is also the cause of many difficulties raised by (Davies 2008).
50
See footnote 43.
51
See also (Collingwood 1938, 243).
52
Incidentally, this is a thesis that Wollheim himself rejects (Wollheim 1987, 44). Recall that, according to him, “The kind of account that has quite rightly been chased out
of the field of language, most notably through the influence of Wittgenstein, is at home
in painting” (Wollheim 1987, 22). A re-psychologisation of the mind is the topic of books
such as (Wollheim 1993, 1999). It would therefore be a trifle unfair to portray Collingwood as ‘outdated’ on this point. If anything, Collingwood and Wollheim are rather ‘in
the same ball park’.
53
Collingwood’s political philosophy is expressed in The New Leviathan (Collingwood
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1992) and in the essays collected in (Collingwood 1989). For a study, see (Boucher 1989).
54
See also (Collingwood 1938, 308).
55
Again, see (Saari 1989) and (D’Oro 2000) on this point.
56
For information, see, e.g., (Baldwin 1991).
57
That Collingwood’s theory was meant to support avant-garde art was actually used
against him in Noël Carroll’s A Philosophy of Mass Art (Carroll 1998, 102).
58
A French translation of an earlier version of this paper will appear in Philosophiques,
vol. 35, n. 1, spring 2009. An earlier version was read at the colloquium Comment
être idéaliste? Bradley et Collingwood, which took place at the Université Blaise Pascal,
Clermont-Ferrand in June 2006 and at the meeting of the British Idealism Specialist Group
of the Political Science Association at Gregynog, Wales, in December 2007. I would like
to thank the participants on both occasions for their comments, as well as David Boucher,
James Connelly, David Davies, Giuseppina D’Oro, Sébastien Gandon, Laurent Jaffro and
Bill Manders either for their help or for comments, over the years, that made their way
into this paper. I would also like to thank Mathieu Marion for help with my English
and for many detailed comments that greatly improved my paper; I am indebted to his
thorough knowledge of British philosophy. Finally, I would like to thank an anonymous
referee for the Baltic Yearbook.
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